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Lessons Learned 
 
   
 
Greg Feldberg 
By Sarah Ward and Rosalind Z. Wiggins 
Greg Feldberg was a senior supervisory financial analyst at the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve experienced in regulating large banks when he was recruited to the Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) where he worked from 2010-11, becoming its Director of 
Research. The FCIC was a bipartisan commission charged with investigating the causes of the 
global financial crisis of 2007-09. Feldberg shared thoughts about some of the challenges faced 
by the commission and why its report is important. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an 
interview with Mr. Feldberg. 
There is always a time constraint and a resource constraint that has to be addressed 
upfront or nothing will get done.  
Feldberg was hired on the research staff of the FCIC in January 2010, six months into its 
mandated 18-month period and right as it was scheduled to begin public hearings. Although 
the infrastructure had been set up, little had been accomplished in the way of substance. He 
immediately began to help the Director of Research identify the expertise needed and 
aggressively recruit people to the research team.  
At least nine or ten were like him, Feldberg says, detailees from federal agencies that paid 
their salaries while they worked on the Commission (Feldberg was a detailee from the 
Federal Reserve). He said, “[o]ne of the first things I did upon getting there as a Fed detailee 
was to call up the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and other regulatory agencies and ask if they had any detailees to send over.”  
Recruiting detailees helped streamline the process of securing the needed expertise but 
didn’t cure all the manpower challenges. “We could have always used more folks to help,” 
says Feldberg. “Even though we had access to anybody in the academic or financial 
community to share their wisdom with us in interviews, just getting people with real 
background and expertise on the issues on staff was extremely valuable.” A similar tactic was 
used to secure investigators, Feldberg said, “The investigation teams were lawyers and 
people from investigative agencies like the SEC and even the U.S. Postal Service and FBI.” 
Subpoena power was a powerful tool that gave the commission a once-in-a lifetime-
opportunity to gather data and document information about the crisis. 
In May, Feldberg was elevated to the position of Director of Research, where he was 
responsible for a research team composed of economists, financial analysts, people from 
financial agencies, and people from the private sector. He viewed the commission’s role as 
documenting the history of the crisis, not just the things that had been reported, but the 
hidden details that no company wanted known. Feldberg describes how he viewed his role 
and how the commission went about its work: 
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For every hearing, we had an investigative team assigned to investigate the company 
whose CEO would be speaking, and we had the research team lay out the issues that 
would be discussed at the hearing and provide information. The investigative team 
was producing two investigative reports that were confidential prior to each hearing 
and would help the commissioners know what to ask. And the research team was 
producing two public reports. When I started, I was part of this frantic effort to 
generate two research reports a month on complex financial issues.  
When he assumed the Research Director role Feldberg saw a unique opportunity to enhance 
the reports: 
The first thing I really focused on . . . was to back up our research efforts with a bunch 
of data projects. I thought we could take advantage of our subpoena power to collect 
data that nobody else was ever going to collect from the financial institutions that 
were involved.  
Feldberg believed that providing the supporting data was the only way to ensure that the 
commission and the public really understand what had caused the crisis.  
However, given the limited time and resources, Feldberg emphasized that “[w]e had to pick 
our targets to some extent because we couldn’t do a deep dive on every single company.” We 
had to “focus the hearings on the topics we thought were important,” Feldberg said. Given 
these constraints he explained, decisions were made to examine an industry by proxy, such 
as investigating Moody’s to examine rating-agency activities.  
The Commission obtained information from important participants in areas of the financial 
industry that were largely unregulated and for which financial regulators had limited 
information about prior to the crisis. An example cited by Feldberg is a survey of hedge 
funds: 
[W]e managed to collect detailed information from hedge fund advisors that 
controlled more than a trillion dollars of assets in more than half the hedge fund 
industry. We collected data on market risk from market participants in the short-term 
funding markets, an area that was subject to run-risk that hadn’t been understood 
before the crisis. The survey covered the dealers, insurance companies, mutual funds, 
money market funds, and any and everybody involved in that.  
Another commission project that Feldberg is particularly proud of is a meticulous “in-depth 
profile of one mortgage-backed security where we relentlessly subpoenaed every company 
that was involved.” The result was The Story of a Mortgage Security: Inside CMLTI 2006-NC2, 
a step-by-step history from June 9, 2006, through September 2010 that “show[ed] what was 
going wrong at every stage from the origination of the loan all the way through to the 
mortgage-backed security and how it [got] divided up for investors into collateralized debt 
obligations or CDOs.” In the final report, Feldberg relates, The Story of a Mortgage Security 
was repeatedly referred to as a concrete example of changes in underwriting standards that 
contributed greatly to the crisis.  
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Seeking out and reporting on what was unknown when the project started was one of 
the commission’s most critical tasks.  
According to Feldberg, telling the whole story of the crisis also meant debunking 
misinformation that existed. He illustrated by commenting on the predominant 
understanding of the crisis as it unfolded: 
[T]here was the housing bubble, which was fueled by funding from the GSEs (Freddie 
Mac and Fannie Mae). A lot of countries around the world had housing bubbles, driven 
largely by macro forces. The housing bubble was in full force in ’03, ’04, and ’05. It 
peaked in late ’05 and early ’06. If all you had was a housing bubble financed by the 
GSEs, you wouldn’t have had the financial crisis.  
Feldberg discussed how much of the commission’s work was focused on going beyond the 
housing bubble and crisis to ferret out and identity the other factors that made this crisis 
different and so severe. That involved, among other things, focusing on the increase in 
demand for risk transfer products, the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and credit 
default swaps (CDSs), that  became so popular starting in ’05, and through ’07, and the 
reasons why and how this second “weird structured finance bubble in which housing assets 
and mortgages were bundled into CDOs and CDSs and ABCP” occurred.  
The Story of a Mortgage Security report, Feldberg said, delved into this in a detailed way and 
laid bare processes that previously had not been public. In its final report, the commission 
criticized government agencies, including the Fed, for poor supervisory oversight in the run-
up to the crisis.  
When asked about potential conflicts of interests among the staff, Feldberg replied, “I like to 
think we were hired for our expertise and our ability to dive into these issues, and that the 
commission never thought that those of us that came from agencies were there to represent 
or defend our agencies.” The commitment to report fully and accurately, he concludes, 
resulted in a fairer and more credible report.  
Gathering information is one challenge, writing the report presents another. 
When asked how he settled on the structure of the commission’s report, Feldberg described 
it as trial and error. The challenge, he said, was to synthesize all the information that they 
had collected into a report that would be readable for policymakers, financial professionals, 
and the public. He elaborated on how the process evolved: 
[The first idea was] to have one journalist write the whole thing, but that was just too 
much. Then we shifted to having more experienced writers pair up with a couple of 
junior folks to write large swaths of it, but that turned out to be too unwieldy. Then 
we hired four journalists to take different sections of the report. That idea really stuck 
in the sense that one journalist wrote the first part pretty much on her own using the 
resources we had. Another journalist wrote the final chapter, which focused on the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. 
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The structure of the bulk of the report—the second through fourth parts—wasn’t settled on 
until September. Feldberg recalls:  
I was sitting in my office reading through some of the interviews and other materials 
that we had, trying to figure out what happened to the investment banks after the 
Lehman failure, and I started writing a section on Morgan Stanley. I wrote a thousand 
words and it got across what happened to Morgan Stanley and I decided we should 
write the whole report in one- to two-thousand-word pieces. I divided the whole 
story into little pieces and assigned them out, and that’s the way it ended up being 
organized.  
The most important value of the report is telling the story as completely and as 
accurately as possible. 
Feldberg stresses that he and other staffers were charged with telling the whole story of the 
crisis with its many nuanced details, as much as possible. “Our goal was to write the 
definitive account of the crisis and why it happened, one that would stand the test of time.”  
He feels that they succeeded by several measures. One measure of that success is that “[t]he 
report is widely cited. It's widely considered to be the definitive account of the crisis.” 
Another is that it debunks some falsely held beliefs. For example, it describes how the crisis 
was caused by two bubbles, a housing bubble (which by itself probably would not have led 
to the massive crisis that occurred) and then a structured finance bubble, which by 2006 
“was driving the mortgage market, an example of the cart driving the horse. There was so 
much money available for mortgages that the demand helped drive down underwriting 
standards.”  
According to Feldberg, focusing on just the housing bubble and underwriting standards 
would not have been sufficient. It was the combination of the two bubbles that lead to the 
crisis. Many people saw the housing bubble coming ahead of time, but few if any saw the 
structured financing bubble developing. “Nobody saw the collapse of the short-term 
wholesale deposit funding market that happened in 2007 coming,” Feldberg explains. “The 
way that risks had been packaged into exotic CDO (collateralized debt obligations) and CDS 
(credit default swaps) products was not something that people were talking about in ’05 and 
’06.”  
To that end, Feldberg believes that the report clearly identifies these practices and products, 
and others that contributed to the crisis. He specifically sees the value of the commission’s 
work and the report as providing a narrative of those factors that made this crisis different 
from other crises, and supporting those conclusions with facts. He emphasized, “The data 
projects we did supported in new and innovative ways what we had been learning in the 
course of our work.”  
When asked about the criticism the report received because the commissioners did not reach 
a consensus, Feldberg pointed out that the commissioners disagreed in their conclusions for 
various reasons: 
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[The Republicans] didn’t want to hold any specific type of product, or specific type of 
market, responsible. Similarly, they didn’t want to say there was anything wrong with 
existing regulations, because they didn’t want their words to be used to satisfy any 
regulatory agenda at all.  
On the other hand, Feldberg says, the Democrats were “trying to provide the basis for 
legislation.”  
Feldberg further comments that the staff had little control over the commissioners’ 
conclusions, but he remains confident that the staff succeeded in its role to “do the report 
and do the analysis.” 
When asked what his dissent would be, Feldberg responded, 
I supported the majority conclusions. They were generally in the right direction, but 
I found them very high-level. I found a lot of them to be the kind of things you could 
have said about any financial crisis. There was poor supervision and risk management 
all around. And people indulged in short-term thinking. If I were to write a dissent, it 
would focus much more on making sure that people understood what was special and 
different about this crisis, such as the design of financial products and how the system 
was allocating risks in really screwed-up ways. I didn’t feel as if the majority or the 
dissenters did that in the way I would have done it. 
 
_____________________________________ 
Dated: January 2021 
YPFS Lessons Learned No: 2019-07 
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